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TOP SECRET

# JOHN A. McCONE

## THE SIXTH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

By

Walter Elder

Edited by Mary S. McAuliffe, DCI Staff Historian

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## CHAPTER IV

In the meanwhile, Cuba remained a sore point for both the CIA and the Kennedys.

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell Taylor to chair a small commission, consisting of Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleign Burke, to investigate. Highly critical of the piecemeal and acquiescent administrative decisions which had accompaned the operation's progress, the Taylor report was mild in comparison with the severely critical internal report prepared by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick.

Robert Kennedy also produced a personal Bay of Pigs report to the President, which he discussed with McCone in late November 1961. The Attorney General was especially critical of Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, because Bissell had told the President the operation was likely to succeed. Robert Kennedy was also highly critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for spending only twenty minutes studying the planned operation before making its first report to the President endorsing the operation.

It is worth noting that McCone was the only official in the





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government privy to all the studies of the Bay of Pigs operation, including the Taylor report, Robert Kennedy's personal report, the Kirkpatrick report, and the views of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

McCone did not dwell on the Bay of Pigs after he took office, but he did draw several conclusions. Firmly believing the decision to go ahead was a mistake, he nevertheless thought it an even worse mistake to dismember the operation once underway, contending that the CIA should have appealed directly to the President to reverse the decision to stand down the air strikes. Concluding as well that the members of the Taylor commission had been too closely involved with the events to have sufficient perspective, he believed the CIA and JCS had to bear special responsibility for advising the new President to go ahead, since at that time these were the only two Washington organizations dealing with international affairs which possessed complete continuity.

Taking a detached view of the operation, McCone was able to concentrate on what the Agency could do to avoid similar mistakes in the future. Leery of large-scale operations involving the Agency's paramilitary capability, McCone strove, with mixed results, to remove the CIA from such enterprises. He also stressed the importance of planning an operation from beginning to end (an attitude which dominated his approach during the Cuban missile crisis). Finally, he insisted that the Agency's estimative function be privy to planned operations, providing early and frequent judgments.

Cuba, however, remained a subject of considerable concern. In April 1961, shortly after President Kennedy established the Taylor Commission, Presidential adviser Walt Rostow speculated that Cuba might join with the Soviet Union in setting up an offensive air or missile base. He additionally posed that Cuba might build its conventional military strength and develop its subversive network to threaten other Latin American nations from without and within. "Its ideological contours are a moral and political offense to us," he concluded, "and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove that offense...."

The Kennedy administration proceeded to address the situation directly. At a White House meeting which McCone attended in late November 1961, the President announced that General Edward Lansdale, acting under the direction of the Attorney General, had already begun to study possible actions to overthrow the Castro regime. These covert activities, explained Robert Kennedy, included anything possible to create internal dissension and discredit Castro. He then proposed that, to accomplish this goal, Lansdale head up a committee made up of representatives of Defense, State, USIA, and CIA, which would cut across organizational lines.

McCone decided that the administration and the Agency both seemed in a state of shock so far as Cuba was concerned. Although skeptical from the beginning about the Lansdale program's prospects for success, he nevertheless recognized that the CIA had a special role and responsibility so far as Cuba was concerned. He himself

supported the notion of dynamic action, but urged that such action not be reckless. Consequently, he recommended that the Lansdale group report to the 5412 oversight committee, which was properly qualified to give political guidance and evaluate proposals for action. In addition, although McCone agreed the facilities of all agencies should be made available for such high-priority operations, he emphasized that these should remain in place and not be removed to form a new unit under Lansdale.

In this way, MONGOOSE, as it came to be known, was launched. With the White House's decision to go ahead (keeping the 5412 Committee fully informed), McCone proceeded to discuss the Lansdale operation with top Agency officials. Acknowledging that the project had to be closely held--Lansdale had asked that the CIA's representative, Richard Helms, report only to the DCI--McCone nevertheless stated he intended to skip no appropriate echelon of the Agency, as such a course would deprive him of the advice of other senior officers. Action would be at the Helms level, and the Agency would offer Lansdale all necessary support and assistance, but without excluding the participation of other Agency members within the strict security guidelines laid down by the President. Further, McCone directed the Board of National Estimates and the DD/I to undertake a continuing evaluation of MONGOOSE, viewing such precautions as a major step toward overcoming the compartmentation which had excluded the DD/I from any advance knowledge of the Bay of Pigs landing.

Significantly, McCone insisted on bringing analytical and estimative functions to bear on Cuban operations from the beginning. Further, he insisted that truly clandestine actions be small. Most importantly, he required that careful records be kept of actions and conversations, himself setting an example by keeping meticulous memoranda for the record.

MONGOOSE represented McCone's first working encounter with Robert Kennedy. The Attorney General, McCone immediately realized, was a dynamic force with a keen interest in the intelligence community, as well as a strong influence on the President. McCone became quite close to him. MONGOOSE also reinforced McCone's awareness of the extent of the administration's obsession with Cuba. He consequently accepted as a personal charge the administration's desire to overthrow Castro. He was not, however, about to allow Lansdale or anyone else dictate the use of CIA sources. Had he detached Agency resources for Lansdale's use, McCone would have lost control. He further insisted on the checks and balances of 5412 committee overview.

The Special Group (5412 Committee), made up of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other appropriate representatives, had been established in 1955 by National Security Council Directive 5412/2 to provide interdepartmental coordination of covert actions. In general, the Group's cognizance extended to any



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covert activity which, because of its impact, could, if exposed, reflect on the official position of the United States. Thus, a sizeable activity aimed solely at intelligence collection through clandestine methods could come under the Group's scrutiny. Conversely, small political actions, with little flap potential, could be undertaken without referring the activity to the Group.

The Kennedys, however, were sufficiently alarmed over the threat of Communist subversion and covert aggression that, in January 1962, another special committee, Special Group (Counterinsurgency), appeared. Largely the brainchild of General Maxwell Taylor, Special Group (CI) aimed at identifying those areas where an insurgent threat existed or threatened to emerge, directing the use of appropriate resources to counter that threat.

In practice, the CIA had always been reluctant to expose its activities to an interdepartmental body. The Defense Department had been similarly reluctant to submit its extensive program of peripheral reconnaissance flights to Special Group review, although, beginning in June 1961, the group began to consider these flights. The Special Group's influence depended, in the final analysis, on the attitude of the President and the Special Group chairman, as well as on the temper of the DCI. Allen Dulles served as an advocate for the CIA's proposed activities. John McCone took the position that, as DCI, he was a personal adviser to the President and thus free to approve or disapprove the CIA's proposals as he saw fit.

The entire Cuban situation was difficult from the outset, and

McCone was careful to warn the President and Attorney General that he anticipated no quick or easy road to success. [With the approval of Ambassador Alphand, a close personal friend of McCone, the French embassy in Havana had agreed to serve as the Agency's Cuban eyes and ears, with Philippe de Vosjoli, SDECE's Washington representative, reporting directly to McCone. De Vosjoli reported that at least] ninety percent of all Cubans supported Castro, while McCone added that of twenty-seven or twenty-eight CIA agents in Cuba, only twelve presently were in communication. Contact even with these was infrequent, and an additional team of seven, infiltrated in December, had been captured (with two featured on a television "confession" show).

Nevertheless, at a Special Group meeting in April 1962, McCone urged a review of our national policy toward Cuba and asked that we consider more aggressive action, including direct military intervention. Noting that various intelligence reports suggested that Castro was in deep trouble, he questioned whether the military strength of the Castro government was as large and as effective as had been understood. In response to objections that such a course might lose us friends in Latin America, McCone countered that a show of strength was more likely to win than lose us friends.

Shortly thereafter, McCone learned from the Attorney General that there was some movement afoot to exchange our prisoners from the Bay of Pigs for food. (Castro had offered to release the prisoners in exchange for a large quantity of drugs and medicines). Later, in

early June, McCone suggested forming a committee to negotiate such a release. Robert Kennedy was generally sympathetic, but did not at that time request covert support for the project. The subject was left for further discussion, with an agreement that it would not be discussed with anyone in CIA, Defense, or State who was active in Cuba operations.

In mid-July, McCone and Robert Kennedy reviewed the Cuban situation in considerable detail. Kennedy thought that, although considerable intelligence had been acquired, the program's action phases had been disappointing. Shortly after, McCone had the opportunity to review MONGOOSE with the President. Since the beginning of February, McCone reported, nine intelligence collection teams (about half the originally-planned number) had been infiltrated into Cuba and maintained in place, thousands of Cuban refugees had been systematically interrogated in Florida, and a number of third-country agents recruited inside Cuba. U-2 overflights were being conducted on a regular two-a-month schedule. The operation was costing the CIA about $1 million per month in direct costs and even more in indirect support costs.

Although McCone was skeptical about the aims and operations of MONGOOSE, he believed the CIA bore a special responsibility to collect intelligence on Cuba. He therefore told the President that this collection effort had produced a substantial amount of hard intelligence on conditions inside Cuba, and a continuation would provide additional intelligence, possibly revealing opportunities for

political, guerrilla or insurgent activities designed to overthrow Castro. McCone added, however, that many individuals felt that more dynamic actions were called for, including mass landings and military activity. McCone did not agree. Our intelligence, he said, did not support this point of view, and any such attempts would face disaster unless the United States was prepared to commit large military forces to support them.

In the meantime, Castro had officially cast his lot with the Soviet Union, and indications were increasing that the USSR was willing to invest substantial amounts of money, not only to keep the Cuban leader afloat, but to enhance his capability to create mischief for the United States. After 1 February 1962, our U-2 flights over Cuba increased from one to two per month, and intelligence reports revealed steady Soviet shipments of military as well as economic aid.

On August 4, McCone learned that eleven Soviet ships believed to be carrying arms were bound for Cuba. McCone asked for further details. On August 5, he received a breakdown on the ships, and he directed immediate U-2 coverage (which began the following day). According to reports, up to 5,000 Soviet technicians had arrived, in addition to military communications equipment. The preliminary U-2 readout, however, was not very helpful, and another flight was planned for August 11.

On August 10, McCone met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, presidential military adviser General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Deputy Secretey of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Attorney

General. It was during this meeting, which approved intensifying MONGOOSE operations, that McCone first shared outside the CIA his fear that the Soviets might introduce offensive missiles into Cuba. His statement had little immediate impact. The experts unanimously and adamantly agreed that this was beyond the realm of possibility.

McCone's conclusion that the USSR might put offensive missiles into Cuba was set in motion by the continuing influx of Soviet military equipment. It was intensified by the arrival of Soviet personnel, then brought to a head by reports which suggested that the Soviet Union was preparing to install surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) there.

Why, asked McCone, would the Soviet Union place SAMs in Cuba? If the United States were to launch a military attack, the SAMs could be easily and quickly destroyed. The SAMs were not being put there to protect Cuban canecutters; therefore, McCone argued, their real purpose was to blind the United States by deterring further U-2 overflights. This action would then permit the Soviet Union to take further steps which they could reveal at a time of their own choosing.

McCone then asked himself what he would do if he were in Khrushchev's shoes. The United States and Soviet Union were balanced in nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but the USSR had a decided edge in intermediate and medium-range missiles. These missiles could not, however, reach the United States from Soviet launch pads. The USSR had not deployed these missiles outside its borders, presumably because they could be redirected against the

Soviet Union if they fell into the wrong hands. However, Cuba was one place where the Soviets could safely put their missiles. As McCone put it, "If I were Khrushchev, I'd put offensive missiles in Cuba. Then I'd bang my shoe on the desk and say to the United States, 'How do you like looking down the end of a gun barrel for a change? Now, let's talk about Berlin and any other subject that I choose, including all your overseas bases.'"

McCone had confidence in the logic of his conviction and was prepared to alert the top policy levels. He recognized that he lacked hard evidence, but was convinced that the implications of putting Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba would be so serious for American national security interests that the contingency should be considered as soon as possible.

He stood absolutely alone.

At noon on August 21, he met with Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Maxwell Taylor, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), and McGeorge Bundy to review the Cuban situation. He noted that since their last meeting on Cuba, the CIA had received intelligence indicating an enormous increase in Soviet military support to Cuba. Further, there now were indications of construction work by Soviet personnel, as well as technicians to handle the newly-delivered Soviet equipment. While the nature of the construction remained unknown, McCone warned that it could be missile sites. For, he emphasized, we had to consider the possibility that



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the Soviets would install offensive weapons in Cuba.

The group proceeded to consider various courses of action open to the United States should the Soviets place MRBMs in Cuba. McCone had a three-part proposal already in hand, calling for 1) an immediate aggressive political action program to awaken Latin America and the Free World; 2) a provocative action against Guantanamo or some other vital American interest, leading to instant United States retaliation; and, 3) immediate commitment of sufficient U.S. military forces to occupy Cuba, destroy the regime, free the people, and establish Cuba as a member of the community of American States. McCone noted that the group was reluctant to consider committing U.S. military forces, however, both because of the magnitude of the task and because of concern about Soviet retaliatory actions elsewhere in the world.

Reaching no conclusions on any course of action, the group at length asked McCone to brief the President on the situation. The following day, McCone reported in detail to the President, adding the personal report of De Vosjoli, who had recently visited Cuba. The President, who appeared quite familiar with the situation, expressed concern, but agreed with General Taylor and McCone that policy decisions should wait until the next day, when he would meet with his principal advisers.

On August 23, therefore, President Kennedy met with Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone to discuss Cuba. The President requested an analysis of the threat which offensive

missiles located in Cuba posed to the United States and Latin America. He requested as well a continuing analysis of the numbers and types of Soviet and Oriental (as reported by De Vosjoli) personnel being introduced, the quantities and types of equipment, their probable uses, and all construction activity in Cuba. In response to the President's question about our ability to discriminate between SAM and surface-to-surface missile sites, McCone said we probably could not differentiate between SAM sites and 350-mile surface-to-surface missiles, but that MRBMs and IRBMs could be distinguished. McNamara noted that portable missiles could not be located under any circumstances.

The President wondered whether we should make a statement of our position in advance, outlining the courses of action open to us in the event that the Soviets should install missiles in Cuba. He also asked what we could do against such missile sites. Could we take them out by air action, or would ground action be required? Could they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla action? He also asked what we should do in Cuba if the Soviets decided to precipitate a crisis in Berlin.

Secretary Rusk received approval for his proposal that the United States inform its NATO allies, particularly Canada, of the growing seriousness of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, strongly opposed his recommendation to remove restrictions on MONGOOSE operations operating out of Guantanamo. McCone again proposed his three-part program to combat the current Cuban

situation. After consideration, the President directed the Defense Department to prepare contingency plans for possible military action against Cuba. He and his advisors agreed, however, that no steps should be taken until full agreement was reached on a policy aimed at completely solving the Cuban problem.

Cuba was our most serious problem, McCone shortly afterward told Robert Kennedy, adding that, in comparison, he would readily give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey. Cuba, he told the Attorney General, was more important than Berlin. It was the key to Latin America; and if Castro succeeded, then most of Latin America would fall to Soviet influence and domination.



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forty-eight hours should the President's terms not be met.

Sunday morning, October 28, with U-2 overflights continuing and no evidence of slow-down on the Cuban missile sites, Moscow broadcast yet another Khrushchev communique--this one announcing that, in the interest of world peace, the Soviet Union had agreed to dismantle and return the Cuban missiles under United Nations verification. Not waiting for the official text, the President drafted a quick acceptance. The immediate crisis was over.

* * *

Serious problems, however, remained. It had become clear to McCone that removing Castro no longer was an objective of American policy, and he was concerned that, as a result of Soviet military and economic aid, Castro would be left in a position to create much mischief. Since no agreement had been reached for on-site inspection, and the SAM system remained in place to limit aerial inspection, the DCI and intelligence community would not be able to verify the removal or check on possible future reintroduction of Cuban missiles. Further, the MONGOOSE operation, tasked with toppling Castro, was in disarray. Lansdale complained he was not being kept informed of JCS planning and that the CIA's Cuban Task Force was acting outside MONGOOSE channels. At the height of the missile crisis (on October 26), a high-level meeting on MONGOOSE agreed to recall intelligence collection teams and discontinue



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sabotage operations while relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were so delicate.

On November 3, McCone informed the Executive Committee that, despite indications that the missiles were being dismantled, there also were signs that the Soviets were taking steps which might represent a continuing threat to the United States. More IL-28s had been uncrated; some fourteen Soviet ships were en route to Cuba, and there were indications that the Soviets were proceeding with plans to develop a submarine support base at Banes. Stressing the unprecedented nature of the SAM system deployment and the fact that the system remained in place to provide a shield from aerial inspection, McCone emphasized that we did not and could not know the exact number of offensive missiles originally placed in Cuba or whether all in fact had been removed. Indeed, McCone pointed out, there remained a distinct possibility that missile complexes could be hidden from view in Cuba's caves. 98

The President listened to McCone's warning but appeared more concerned about the question of past intelligence failures. For by this time postmortems had begun to surface alleging either a near intelligence failure or the withholding of vital intelligence information on the Cuban missile build-up. Deeply concerned, McCone had already ordered an intensive internal investigation. Now the President himself requested a review of the entire intelligence community, seeking a judgment as to whether better intelligence and intelligence evaluation could have forecast Cuban developments more

however, that the United States continue its surveillance and be prepared to act if a plane were shot down. 98

With the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the completion of Donovan's mission, McCone again pressed for low-level flights over Cuba--a recommendation supported by the USIB but opposed by both McNamara and Rusk because of its possible political consequences. Noting that the administration could not very well ignore the views of the DCI and USIB, President Kennedy proposed three sorties on a trial basis. But, after considering the pros and cons, the President on May 21 decided to postpone a subsequent low-level mission on the grounds of insufficient urgency.

Following the missile crisis, Cuban exile groups escalated their activities, but the Executive Committee was unable to come to a firm agreement on how to respond. Similarly, the Special Group to consider Cuban sabotage operations met with disagreement and indecision. It was clear McCone stood virtually alone in his view that the United States should sustain an aggressive approach towards Cuba, with the dual aim of getting rid of both the Soviet presence and Castro. No senior officials went so far as to propose that the covert action program be stopped; but the original impetus which had given birth to the program had all but disappeared.

American policy towards Cuba, and especially the Agency's role in supporting this policy, remained ambigious for the rest of McCone's tenure. Officially, the United States held the Soviet

military presence in and Castro's control over Cuba to be unacceptable. Practically, however, the disposition to take strong actions had weakened. Instead, the administration was willing to accept the removal of the missiles as an adequate foreign policy achievement.

McCone never accepted this judgment; he never was comfortable with the policy restrictions placed on Cuban operations, and he never wavered in his conviction that in order to carry out the tasks levied on him as DCI, he needed the freedom to carry out intensive reconnaissance and covert operations.

Under President Johnson, there were flurries of concern about Cuba; but, after the missile crisis, the momentum had largely disappeared. The United States government turned its attention to other issues, and McCone found himself once again fully engaged.

# CHAPTER XVIII

Shortly before the coup began, on 1 November 1963, Diem suddenly became cooperative.

Lodge and Admiral Harry Felt (CINCPAC) had been at the Presidential palace until almost noon. Rather than see Felt off at the airport, Diem asked if Lodge would remain. Lodge stayed, and Diem proceeded to tell him that he could understand President Kennedy's concerns about South Vietnam. Lodge should assure the President that he, Diem, was prepared to take almost any steps the United States considered appropriate to correct existing problems and improve relations.

Diem's concessions--if that was what they were--came too late. At about the same time, General Don's aide-de-camp directed Lou Conein to go at once to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Assigned a private telephone, Conein proceeded to provide a comprehensive, current and coherent account of the coup to the CIA station in Saigon. The station, in turn, informed Washington.

The first reports reached Washington shortly after midnight. By mid-morning it was clear the coup was likely to succeed. By this time, however, both Diem and Nhu were dead, and the President was

concerned about the circumstances. When the facts became known, he said, he hoped the new government would be able to state that the Ngo brothers had either committed suicide or violated their surrender agreement, rather than been murdered in cold blood.

The President was also concerned that the new government might be tempted to offer anmesty to the Viet Cong. He consequently was emphatic that we watch with care the type of political leadership the military group might install. Warning against the installation of ultra-liberals or quasi-Communists with a free hand in political affairs, he remarked that he was more interested in an effective than a "pretty" government.

As a result, President Kennedy sent William Colby, in the capacity of Presidential representative, to Saigon--an assignment which McCone noted with pleasure as a mark of great confidence in both Colby and the CIA.

On November 18, McCone, Rusk, McNamara and Bundy flew to Honolulu to confer with Lodge and Harkins. McCone later reported that the formal briefing sessions had gone fairly predictably until an economist named Silver from AID had discussed the South Vietnamese economy, with its huge deficits and unfavorable balance of trade. This briefing triggered a lively discussion and the general conclusion that the Vietnamese economic situation was bleak, with no apparent solution in sight.

There was other bad news as well. In some areas, the Viet Cong reportedly had a better strategic hamlet and school system than the



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government. And it was clear to everyone present that the military situation was far from rosy, although Harkins tried to put it in a good light. The meeting decided that a major effort should be made to construct strategic hamlets and to wage anti-guerrilla warfare in the delta region, but McCone returned more discouraged than ever about Vietnam and believed McNamara and Bundy shared this impression. Lodge, McCone remarked, would emerge from Vietnam either as a fourteen-foot-tall political giant or as a thoroughly washed-up government official.

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The end of the Diem era marked one kind of transition in Vietnam; President Kennedy's assassination, on November 22, marked another.

The day after the assassination, as official Washington and the world were trying to come to grips with the shocking news, McCone told his morning meeting that he knew very little about the new President's personal relationships around Washington or his position on current issues. In late August, Lyndon Johnson as Vice President had been opposed to ousting the Diem regime, but McCone had not even spoken with him since the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange.

McCone then reviewed the CIA memorandum on world reactions to the President's assassination and ordered that it be disseminated. He also reviewed the President's Intelligence Checklist and directed



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that it be delivered to the White House as usual. Johnson was unaware of the checklist, having previously received the Current Intelligence Bulletin. McCone reported that Johnson had told McGeorge Bundy to carry on as before, and that the Agency should therefore continue to move its publications through the usual channels until directed otherwise.

In other ways, McCone attempted to carry on as before. Before the morning meeting, he had instructed Walt Elder to telephone Johnson's secretary to tell her that he would be at the White House at 9:00 a.m. as usual, to give the President his regular morning intelligence briefing. This message was relayed as a statement of fact. The only question was whether Johnson would be going to his old office in the Executive Office Building or to the Oval Office. The word came back that Johnson was on his way to the White House.

McCone accordingly was at the White House by 9:00 a.m. At 9:15, President Johnson arrived.

Johnson opened the conversation by recalling a long background of association and friendship with McCone. On a number of issues which had arisen since McCone had become DCI, Johnson said he and McCone had seen eye to eye. Expressing great respect for the CIA and complete confidence in McCone as DCI, Johnson said he wanted McCone to continue in the future doing exactly as he had done in the past.

After McCone in turn expressed his confidence in the President and stated his desire to support him in every way, he reviewed some

of the items from the President's checklist, explaining the nature of the publication. Johnson asked that, for the next few days, McCone continue to brief him personally every morning and that senior CIA officials brief the President's staff. Johnson also directed that any urgent matter of importance be brought to his personal attention at any hour of the day or night. In this, he designated no intermediary.

That noon, McCone met with both Johnson and Bundy to relay the information that Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City. That evening, McCone reviewed this information with Secretary Rusk, in addition volunteering the Agency's assistance in coping with the flood of official visitors coming to attend the funeral. Rusk agreed to call on him for help.

After informing his November 24 morning meeting that he would make an effort to dispel the widely-held view that it was somehow "immoral" for the DCI to be seen openly in his role as a direct adviser to the President, McCone briefed Johnson for about twenty minutes in his private residence. The President, McCone suggested, should receive an early briefing on the Soviet long-range striking capability, air defense posture, and the condition of the Soviet economy. McCone also suggested that the President learn about the CIA's operational programs, adding that the Agency was watching Venezuela and Ecuador very closely because of Cuban subversive activities.

That afternoon, McCone met with the President, Rusk, Ball,

McNamara, Bundy and Lodge to discuss the situation in Vietnam. Lodge reported that the United States was in no way responsible for the deaths of Diem and Nhu (had they followed his advice, he said, they would be alive today) and said he was hopeful about the future. The change in South Vietnam's government had been an improvement, and by February or March we would see marked progress.

McCone, concerned lest Lodge's statements leave the President with the impression that we were on the road to victory, disagreed. The Agency, he cautioned, had observed a continuing increase in Viet Cong activities since November 1, including military attacks. It had also observed a high volume of messages on the Viet Cong military and political communications networks, which could indicate preparations for sustained guerrilla attacks. Moreover, the new government's military leaders were having considerable difficulty in organizing the government's political structure and were receiving little if any help from civilians, who were staying on the sidelines in their traidtional role as critics. In consequence, McCone could not at this time offer an optimistic appraisal of Vietnam's future prospects.

Here, President Johnson observed that he approached the situation in Vietnam with some misgivings. A great number of Americans had questioned the United States' role in supporting the coup, and there were those in Congress who strongly believed we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these factors caused him considerable anxiety. He was not at all sure the United States had



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followed the right course in upsetting the Diem regime; but now that it was done, we had to see that we accomplished our objectives.

In addition, Johnson now told them, he had never been happy with American operations in Vietnam. The dissensions within the American community there displeased him, and he told Lodge that he wanted the situation cleaned up. Any official who did not go along with agreed U.S. policy there should be removed.

At this point, Bundy remarked that we were searching for a successor to William Trueheart as Saigon Deputy Chief of Mission. What was needed was a capable administrator to run the country team. In response, Johnson repeated that the Ambassador was in charge and that he, the President, was holding him personally responsible for the situation.

Vietnam's economy was the subject of particular concern, and McNamara now commented that the United States would have to be generous with its aid, not expecting the South Vietnamese government to produce miracles. Johnson replied that he supported the concept of generous aid but wanted it made abundantly clear that he did not think we had to re-make every Asian after our own image. Too often, he observed, when the United States became involved in the affairs of another country, it felt an obligation to reform the country along American lines. This, he said, was a mistake. He himself was anxious to get on with winning the war; he did not want so much effort devoted to so-called social reforms.

Following this meeting, Bundy issued a statement saying that the



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United States would continue the late President Kennedy's Vietnam policies as they had been confirmed at a mid-November meeting in Honolulu. McCone also observed that, for the first time, he had received an indication of what the Johnson tone would be.

McCone did not brief Johnson on November 25, the day of President Kennedy's funeral, and at a State Department reception that evening, the President apologized to McCone for it. Were there were any developments which required his personal attention?, he asked. McCone replied that there were not and that he would call him if any developed.

The following day, McCone met with the President for about twenty minutes. Johnson asked whether all appropriate Agency resources were being made available to support the FBI's investigation of the assassination. He then told McCone with considerable contempt that certain Justice Department officials had proposed an independent panel, headed by someone like Thomas E. Dewey, to investigate the assassination. Johnson had rejected this proposal, only to learn that an identical plan would appear as lead editorial in the Washington Post. Furious at what he believed was a deliberate leak, he had finally succeeded in killing the editorial by intervening personally with Katherine Graham. 98

McCone met again with the President on November 28 for about thirty minutes. After reviewing the checklist, Johnson questioned him about South Vietnam, Venezuela, Greece, Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia. He asked McCone to recommend someone as Ambassador to

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McCone History

C H R O N O L O G Y

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| 10 November 1960 | President-elect Kennedy announces that Allen W. Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover will continue in their positions. |
| 17 April 1961 | Landing at the Bay of Pigs |
| 22 April 1961 | Study group formed (Maxwell Taylor, Arleigh Burke, Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles) to examine Bay of Pigs operation. |
| 4 May 1961 | President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) reconstituted with James Killian as chairman. |
| 28 June 1961 | Taylor named Military Representative to the President and Chairman of the Special Group (5412). |
| 30 August 1961 | USSR resumes nuclear testing in the atmosphere |
| 7 September 1961 | President Kennedy confers with John McCone on nuclear issues. |
| 19 September 1961 | Kennedy asks McCone to become the Director of Central Intelligence. |
| 27 September 1961 | Kennedy announces the appointment of McCone. |
| 13 October 1961 | McCone becomes consultant; travels to the Far East until 23 October. |

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| 28 October 1961 | Dulles and McCone visit Western Europe until 13 November. |
| 21 November 1961 | McCone meets with President and Robert Kennedy to discuss new program for Cuba. |
| 29 November 1961 | McCone sworn in by Chief Justice Warren |
| 30 November 1961 | McCone attends meeting of NSC committee on nuclear testing. |
| 30 November 1961 | McCone attends first meeting of United States Intelligence Board (USIB) as chairman. |
| 1 December 1961 | McCone attends first meeting of Special Group (5412) as DCI. |
| 4 December 1961 | McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to discuss NSA and national estimates |
| 5 December 1961 | McCone establishes study group under Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.. |
| 6 December 1961 | Mrs. McCone dies. |
| 11 December 1961 | McCone meets with President Kennedy alone. |
| 12 December 1961 | McCone calls on J. Edgar Hoover. |
| 13 December 1961 | DDCI becomes CIA representative on USIB. |
| 15 December 1961 | McCone meets with Phillipe de Vosjoli. |

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| 27 December 1961 | General Cabell announces retirement effective 31 January 1962. |
| 5 January 1962 | Schuyler, Coyne added to Kirkpatrick study group. |
| 6 January 1962 | McCone attends NSC meeting on Laos. |
| 8 January 1962 | McCone meets with Joint Chiefs of Staff. |
| 12 January 1962 | McCone briefs General Eisenhower in Palm Desert. |
| 15 January 1962 | McCone's name submitted to Senate Armed Services Committee. |
| 16 January 1962 | President Kennedy issues letter of instructions to DCI. |
| 16 January 1962 | McCone meets with Ambassador [Alphand] 6 and Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg. |
| 18 January 1962 | Confirmation hearings begin |
| 18 January 1962 | DCI attends first meeting of Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). |
| 19 January 1962 | McCone meets with The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the PFIAB. |
| 20 January 1962 | McCone briefs President Truman at Mayflower Hotel. |

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| 22 January 1962 | McCone meets with House Sub-Committee on CIA. |
| 28 January 1962 | McCone meets with Chiefs of Station from Western Hemisphere Division in Panama until 2 February. |
| 31 January 1962 | Senate confirms McCone by floor vote of 71-12; total vote is 84-15. |
| 6 February 1962 | McCone speaks to senior seminar at Foreign Service Institute. |
| 8 February 1962 | McCone meets with Senate Sub-Committee on CIA. |
| 17 February 1962 | Richard Bissell resigns as Deputy Director for Plans; succeeded by Richard Helms. |
| 19 February 1962 | Deputy Director ate for Research established as new directorate with Herbert A. Scoville, Jr. as head. |
| 19 February 1962 | McCone meets with Board of Inquiry chaired by Judge Prettyman to study implications of Powers' case. |
| 22 February 1962 | McCone meets with Major General Marshall S. Carter. |
| 28 February 1962 | Kennedy receives first briefing by Arthur C. Lundahl |



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| 7 March 1962 | McCone presents Carter to President Kennedy; Carter named DDCI on 9 March. |
| 30 March 1962 | Robert Amory, Jr. resigns as Deputy Director/for Intelligence. |
| 1 April 1962 | Office of General Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel, and Office of Comptroller moved to Office of the DCI; John Bross named Comptroller. |
| 10 April 1962 | Kirkpatrick named to new position as Executive Director. |
| 23 April 1962 | Ray S. Cline named DD/I |
| 3 May 1962 | Jack Earman becomes Inspector General; Walter Elder named as Executive Assistant to the DCI. |
| 15 May 1962 | DCI attends meeting of National Security Council with Congressional leaders on American role in Laos. |
| 3 June 1962 | McCone travels to Far East until 17 June; develops basic position paper on situation in Southeast Asia. |
| 4 June 1962 | Albert D. Wheelon, Jr. named Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence. |

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| 29 June 1962 | McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget to review the projected intelligence community budget. |
| 10 July 1962 | McCone meets with Frank G. Wisner on latter's future. |
| 12 July 1962 | McCone discusses consultant status with Allen W. Dulles. |
| 20 July 1962 | President Kennedy briefed in detail on information derived from Anatole Golitsen. |
| 27 July 1962 | McCone becomes immersed in nuclear testing issue and the role of intelligence in the event of a treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere. |
| 28 July 1962 | McCone meets with [Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos.] |
| 10 August 1962 | At Cuban meeting, McCone makes first explicit statement outside Agency on the possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba. |
| 10 August 1962 | Najeeb Halaky proposes covert development of super-sonic transport. |
| 21 August 1962 | McCone warns senior government officials about offensive missiles in Cuba. |

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| 21 August 1962 | McCone attends meeting to discuss intensified operations against North Vietnam. ✓ |
| 22 August 1962 | McCone advises President Kennedy about possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba; also on 23 August with senior advisers present. |
| 23 August 1962 | McCone leaves Washington until 24 Sept. |
| 29 August 1962 | McCone marries Mrs. Paul Piggott in Seattle; SAMs in Cuba photographed. |
| 7,10,13,16 and 19 September 1962 | McCone sends cables reiterating his concern about missiles in Cuba. |
| 24 September 1962 | McCone meets with Robert Kennedy on ransoming brigade prisoners in Cuba. |
| 27 September 1962 | McCone meets with President [Ayub of Pakistan] in New York. 6, 11 |
| 4 October 1962 | McCone urges Special Group to direct U-2 coverage of Cuba. |
| 9 October 1962 | Special Group approves U-2 coverage. |
| 10 October 1962 | President Kennedy briefed on IL-28 crates; Kennedy orders limitations on dissemination of information about offensive weapons. |





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| 12 October 1962 | SAC takes over U-2 overflights of Cuba. |
| 14 October 1962 | U-2 overflies San Cristobal MRBM site. |
| 15 October 1962 | NPIC identifies MRBMs |
| 16 October 1962 | McCone notified; returns from Seattle. |
| 17 October 1962 | McCone develops position paper on Cuba. |
| 18 October 1962 | IRBM sites identified. |
| 18 October 1962 | NSC Executive Committee divides into two study groups to consider "fast" and "slow" courses of action. |
| 19 October 1962 | Special National Intelligence Estimate concludes that USSR would not risk general war over Cuba. |
| 19 October 1962 | McCone develops position on measures beyond a blockade. |
| 20 October 1962 | Chinese Communists attack India |
| 21 October 1962 | McCone briefs Vice-President Johnson on Cuba. |
| 21 October 1962 | Briefers go to London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa. |
| 22 October 1962 | Meeting with Congressional leadership just prior to President Kennedy's speech. |
| 23 October 1962 | President Kennedy signs blockade proclamation. |

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| 24 October 1962 | Soviet ships near Cuba stop or turn. |
| 27 October 1962<br>28 October 1962 | Messages from USSR show willingness to avoid confrontation. |
| 29 October 1962 | McCone orders post-mortem on handling of intelligence. |
| 2 November 1962 | Cuban refugee reports on missiles in caves. |
| 5 November 1962 | President Kennedy requests review of intelligence handling. |
| 9 November 1962 | McCone meets with Rusk to protest nibbling away at approved operational programs. |
| 14 November 1962 | PFIAB requests post-mortem on intelligence handling. |
| 17 November 1962 | Kennedy and Eisenhower meet at McCone's residence. |
| 20 November 1962 | Kennedy announces lifting of the blockade. |
| 4 December 1962 | McCone meets with Gilpatric to discuss Air Force view of NRO. |
| 17 December 1962 | Kennedy approves concept of covert support to Congo government. |

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| 27 December 1962 | Report on intelligence community's handling of intelligence relating to Cuban missile crisis completed for PFIAB. |
| 2 January 1963 | NPIC moves into Building 213. |
| 3 January 1963 | McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to discuss A-11, SWITCHBACK, policy towards Cuba. |
| 10 January 1963 | Special Group reviews reconnaissance over Cuba. |
| 10 January 1963 | McGeorge Bundy discusses DOD-CIA friction; raises Kennedy's concern over Chinese Communist nuclear potential. |
| 17 January 1963 | McCone meets with [Italian Prime Minister Fanfani]. 6, 8 |
| 21 January 1963 | Meeting with President Kennedy on surfacing A-11. |
| 27 January 1963 | McCone meets with Chiefs of Station in Panama until 29 January. |
| 30 January 1963 | Col. Delsany, SDECE, admits charges of KGB penetrations and French espionage against US nuclear energy program. |





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| 31 January 1963 | McCone attends meeting with Kennedy to discuss European problems. |
| 1 February 1963 | McCone develops basic position paper on Europe. |
| 6 February 1963 | Public statement by DCI on Cuba before Stennis sub-committee; DOD public briefing. |
| 10 February 1963 | McCone travels to Paris and London until 17 February. |
| 28 February 1963 | McCone talks with Bundy on lack of policy towards Cuba and problems in the Middle East. |
| 4 March 1963 | Meeting with President Kennedy on Cuban reconnaissance gap. |
| 11 March 1963 | Meeting with President Kennedy on the Middle East with special reference to Yemen. |
| 13 March 1963 | McCone meets with the President and then the NSC to discuss Latin America and policy towards Cuba. |
| 13 March 1963 | McCone and Gilpatric sign new NRO agreement. |

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| 21 March 1963 | McCone meets with Brockway McMillan, new Director/NRO. |
| 25 March 1963 | Meeting with President Kennedy to discuss special Agency operation aimed at exposing the KGB. |
| 26 March 1963 | Meeting with Dean Rusk to discuss the Middle East with special reference to Israel's nuclear potential. |
| 29 March 1963 | Executive Committee meeting on raids by Cuban exiles. |
| 9 April 1963 | McCone meets with Stewart Alsop for general background briefing. |
| 11 April 1963 | McCone develops basic position paper on responsibility for reconnaissance over denied areas. |
| 11 April 1963 | Special Group discusses sabotage operations against Cuba. |
| 15 - 17 April 1963 | President Kennedy, the Attorney-General, and the Secretary of State briefed on special operation against [French intelligence] service. |

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| 20 April 1963 | At NSC meeting on Laos, President Kennedy requests study of increased pressures against North Vietnam. |
| 23 April 1963 | Clark Clifford succeeds Killian as Chairman, PFIAB. |
| 25 April 1963 | President approves low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba. |
| 25 April 1963 | Scoville submits resignation as DD/R effective 14 June 1963 |
| 26 April 1963 | McCone travels to Paris, Rome, and Frankfurt until 8 May. |
| 7 May 1963 | Penkovsky put on trial in Moscow. |
| 9 May 1963 | NSC meeting on US support for India. |
| 13-14 May 1963 | McCone meets with Rusk to discuss support for [Mondlane] 6 |
| 14 May 1963 | McCone meets with Clark Clifford. |
| 15 May 1963 | McCone meets with President Kennedy to discuss Penkovsky |



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| 18 May 1963 | McCone develops position paper on Haiti. |
| 21 May 1963 | McCone attends three meetings with President Kennedy; low-level reconnaissance over Cuba; high-yield, large megatonnage nuclear weapons; Haiti. |
| 3 June 1963 | McCone develops position paper for discussion with Gilpatric on Air Force push to take over all reconnaissance. |
| 7 June 1963 | McCone presents his view of the world in speech to National War College. |
| 14 June 1963 | McCone meets with Rusk to discuss relations with France. |
| 19 June 1963 | McCone attends three meetings with President Kennedy; the Profumo case; Laos; Cuba. |
| 21 June 1963 | McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy on British Guiana. |
| 21 June 1963 | McCone meets with Rusk to discuss covert program on Cuba. |
| 25 June 1963 | McCone develops position paper on the role of intelligence in a nuclear test ban treaty. |



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| 26 June 1963 | McCone notes Roy Tod's paper on an inventory of intelligence community assets. |
| 1 July 1963 | DCI's Scientific Advisory Board established under Dr. Kinzel. |
| 9 July 1963 | President Kennedy briefed on mosaic of [Israel], gas bomb in Yemen, and findings of the Purcell Panel on reconnaissance satellites. |
| 10 July 1963 | McCone writes McNamara on need to review intelligence community programs. |
| 21 July 1963 | McCone meets with Rusk to discuss DeGaulle. |
| 23 July 1963 | McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy to hear John J. McCloy report on the Middle East. |
| 23 July 1963 | Sgt. Dunlap commits suicide. |
| 30 July 1963 | McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy on Laos. |
| 5 August 1963 | DD/R re-constituted as DD/Science and Technology with Wheelon as head. |



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| 5 August 1963 | Nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow. |
| 16 August 1963 | McCone presents position on test ban treaty to Stennis sub-committee. |
| 21 August 1963 | McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy to discuss actions by Diem government against the Buddhests. ✓ |
| 24 August 1963 | Department of State Telegram 243 sent to Saigon. ✓ |
| 26 August 1963 | Saigon station officers in contact with Generals Khiem and Minh. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents credentials to South Vietnam government |
| 31 August 1963 | John Richardson cables his view that there will be no coup. |
| 2 September 1963 | McCone reviews two papers on Diem government; one by William Colby; one by George Carver. |
| 4 September 1963 | McCone meets with McNamara and Rusk to discuss terms of reference for review of intelligence community programs. |
| 9 September 1963 | John Bross appointed Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation. |

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| 10 September 1963 | McCone develops position paper for meetings with President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy on Vietnam. ✓ |
| 11 September 1963 | Huntington D. Sheldon cables his views from Saigon; McCone asks Agency experts to answer six basic questions on Vietnam. ✓ |
| 16 September 1963 | Ambassador Lodge requests Lansdale as replacement for Richardson. |
| 19 September 1963 | McCone writes Lodge about COS Saigon. |
| 19 September 1963 | Colby briefs Special Group on re-vamping Agency operations in the Far East. |
| 20 September 1963 | McCone briefs McGeorge Bundy on plans to reorganize Saigon station and a covert program aimed at the KGB. |
| 20 September 1963 | McCone develops basic position paper on National Reconnaissance Program. |
| 24 September 1963 | McCone develops basic position paper on Agency role in Vietnam. ✓ |

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| 3 October 1963 | McCone asks John Richardson to return to Washington on temporary duty; Dave Smith acting COS Saigon. |
| 5 October 1963 | After hearing trip report by McNamara and Taylor, President Kennedy states publicly that war in Vietnam can be won by the end of 1965; McCone takes pessimistic view. ✓ |
| 7 October 1963 | McCone meets with John Richardson. |
| 9 October 1963 | President Kennedy answers two questions at press conference about Richardson and the Agency. |
| 16 October 1963 | Far East Division develops basic paper on re-organization of Saigon station. |
| 17 October 1963 | McCone discusses role of Air Force and national intelligence assets with Gilpatric. |
| 25 October 1963 | McCone develops position paper for meeting with President Kennedy on coup plotting in Vietnam. ✓ |
| 1 November 1963 | Diem government overthrown by Vietnamese generals. ✓ |

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| 3 November 1963 | President Kennedy orders Colby to go to Saigon as Presidential emissary. |
| 12 November 1963 | McCone, Helms meet with President Kennedy for basic discussion of Cuba; President is shown Cuban rifle captured in Venezuela. |
| 18 November 1963 | McCone attends conference in Honolulu on Vietnam until 21 November. ✓ |
| 18 November 1963 | Executive Director and Comptroller functions merged under Kirkpatrick. |
| 22 November 1963 | President Kennedy assassinated in Dallas. |
| 23 November 1963 | McCone meets with President Johnson alone. |
| 24 November 1963 | McCone meets with President Johnson and Lodge on Vietnam. ✓ |
| 28 November 1963 | McCone meets with President Johnson who asks that McCone play an active role as a policy advisor. |
| 29 November 1963 | McCone attends meeting with President Johnson on A-11. |

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| 5 December 1963 | President Johnson holds first NSC meeting; McCone presents intelligence briefing. |
| 6 December 1963 | McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss COS, Saigon; Peer de Silva named; Johnson sends message to Lodge. |
| 7 December 1963 | McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss changing the image of the DCI and CIA. |
| 12 December 1963 | McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget to review the Agency's covert action program. |
| 13 December 1963 | McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to discuss the need for economy in intelligence operations. |
| 13 December 1963 | McCone meets with Rusk and Harriman who approve concept of releasing information on Soviet economy. |
| 16 December 1963 | McCone visits Saigon to install de Silva - ✓ until 20 December. |
| 21 December 1963 | McCone presents his views on Vietnam to ✓ President Johnson. |

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| 27 December 1963 | McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ Ranch; Johnson reiterates his views on McCone's policy role. |
| 31 December 1963 | McCone meets with General Eisenhower in Pasadena and again on 2 January 1964 to discuss President Johnson's budget plans. |
| 4 January 1964 | McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ Ranch to review meetings with General Eisenhower. |
| 7 January 1964 | McCone attends meeting to hear General Krulak discuss proposals for intensified operations against North Vietnam. |
| 9 January 1964 | Thomas Dale of The New York Times publishes article on Soviet economy with attribution to CIA; other newsmen briefed. |
| 9 January 1964 | McCone attends meetings with President Johnson on Panama. |
| 13 January 1964 | McCone develops position paper on how plan to release information on Soviet economy was mis-handled. |

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| 14 January 1964 | McCone attends meetings on Robert Kennedy's trip to meet Sukarno. |
| 14 January 1964 | Cyrus Vance succeeds Roswell Gilpatric effective 28 January. |
| 18 January 1964 | McCone travels to Paris, London, Rome, Madrid, Bonn - until 1 February. |
| 7 February 1964 | McCone attends meetings on Cuban fishing boats and Guantanamo water supply. |
| 11 February 1964 | McCone develops position paper on reconnaissance after Air Force deployment to fly U-2s out of Clark Field. |
| 28 February 1964 | McCone develops position paper in preparation for trip to Vietnam. |
| 28 February 1964 | McCone attends meeting with President Johnson on surfacing A-11. |
| 4 March 1964 | William Bundy succeeds Roger Hilsman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. |
| 4 March 1964 | USIB re-organized. |

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| 4-5 March 1964 | McCone meets with General Eisenhower who discusses relations with de Gaulle. |
| 6 March 1964 | McCone travels to Vietnam until 13 March; McCone dissents on McNamara's trip report; reports policy disagreement separately to President Johnson. |
| 17 March 1964 | NSC meeting on Vietnam. |
| 1 April 1964 | McCone develops basic position paper on NRP for use with Baker panel of PFIAB. |
| 2 April 1964 | At evening seminar, McCone develops position paper on operations against North Vietnam. |
| 7 April 1964 | McGeorge Bundy develops position paper on Covert Program Against Cuba for use in meeting with President Johnson. |
| 22 April 1964 | McCone talks to McGeorge Bundy about lack of direct briefings of the President by the DCI. |
| 29 April 1964 | McCone talks to President Johnson about lack of direct access. |
| 2 May 1964 | NSC meeting on Cuban overflights. |

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| 5 May 1964 | McCone sets forth position on "The Invisible Government." |
| 5 May 1964 | McCone attends meeting with President Johnson on Cuba and Laos; remains for Tuesday lunch meeting with the President, McNamara, Taylor and Bundy. |
| 6 May 1964 | McCone attends meeting with President Johnson to consider General Khanh's statements about war footing and march north. ✓ |
| 14 May 1964 | McNamara's report on trip to Vietnam discusses bombing North Vietnam. ✓ |
| 16 May 1964 | McCone gives President Johnson Agency estimate on action against North Vietnam. ✓ |
| 18 May 1964 | At meeting on Laos and Vietnam, Rusk raises question of when does the United States commit troops. ✓ |
| 24 May 1964 | Meetings all day with President Johnson on Southeast Asia. ✓ |
| 25 May 1964 | William Bundy paper on Courses of Action on Southeast Asia. |

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| 28 May 1964 | McCone goes to Honolulu for meeting on Vietnam until 3 June. |
| 4,5,6,7 June | McCone attends meetings with President Johnson on Laos with the President asking, "What comes next?" |
| 6 June 1964 | McGeorge Bundy and Michael Forrestal raise with McCone the possibility of an Agency program along pre-SWITCHBACK lines. |
| 11 June 1964 | McCone develops position paper on Southeast Asia. ✓ |
| 11 June 1964 | McCone writes McGeorge Bundy about PFIAB report on NRP. |
| 15 June 1964 | McCone meets with President Johnson to suggest that McCone leave his post; President asks that he remain until after the election. |
| 17 June 1964 | McCone develops position paper on NRP. |
| 30 June 1964 | McCone issues guidance for developing requirements for reconnaissance satellites. |